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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MARJORIE LEE BAKER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

ALVIN D. BAKER,

Case No.
12098

Defendant-Appellant.

Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action in which both of the
parties sought divorce, custody of the children and
a division of their property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court granted a divorce to the Defendant and granted custody of the minor children
to the Plaintiff. The District Court also ordered the
Defendant to pay attorney's fees, some of the debts
of the parties, and support money for the benefit
of the children. Plaintiff was ordered to pay some
of the debts of the parties. The court awarded a onehalf interest in the home and furnishings to each
of the parties, and support money for the benefti
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of the parties, and permitted the person with
custody of the children to use the home and furnishings.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the
lower court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts by Appellant is essentially correct. The only comment which Respondent
would make is that the division of property is not
specified in the statement of facts although Respondent will deal with this matter in the argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN TO
THEIR MOTHER, THE RESPONDENT.

The Appellant really asks this Court to review
the record made in trial and to substitute its findings for those of the Trial Court. The thrust of the
appeal is factual. This Court will, therefore, have
to review the entire record, and most of what is said
in both briefs is directed to the evidence and to the
inferences which the Trial Court could draw from
the evidence. Since this is so, Respondent will at-
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tempt to make reference to Appellants sub-points
for the convenience of the reader, but will not attempt to meet each point head-on as Respondent
submits that it is the entire record which is here
for review, not merely certain portions of the evidence cited in support of an inference or conclusion urged by either party.
Respondent has no issue with Appellants general position that a Supreme Court in an equity case
has broad powers to review findings in the case. It
is well settled in this State, as Appellant concedes,
that this Court will not disturb the findings of a District Court in a divorce case unless the resultant
decree is so inequitable that good conscience demands that it will be reversed.'1
The findings here and the resultant decree reveal nothing which would support the view that
Appellant was treated unfairly, let alone meet the
conceded standard necessary to secure a decision
reversing the Trial Court.
The rational of the standard is that the Trial
Court has the inherent advantage in the determinatio nof the truth of falsity of testimony since it has
a live witness before it, whereas an Appellate Court
has only the words of the transcript devoid of the
manner of answering or other indications which
might lend support or credence to testimony of
one witness and to disbelief of another. A trial judge
l.

McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P. 2d 961; Watts
v. Watts, 21 Utah 2d 137, 442 P. 2d 30.
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with experience in domestic cases which generally involve the same basic problems, and with the
advantages of professional assistance in the case at
bar and in other cases, can often detect evidences
of emotional stability or the lack of it by testimony
presented and by observation of the reaction of a
witness to the stress situations produced in trial.
The District Judge may observe the reaction or the
lack of reaction to the testimony of another witness, to the manner of treating other persons in
court, to the way in which the parties have observed
the rulings of the Court, and to many other things
which cannot become a part of the reporter's notes
or be published in a transcript. These observations
are intended to show the validity of the rule adopted
by this Court as its standard in dealing on appeal
with an attempt to reverse a ruling of a lower Court
in an equity case, and not to exhaust all of the
other reasons in support of the rule.
Appellant in sub-point B claims error in the trial
court's finding that the mother was more stable than
the Appellant. This is one of the reasons that the
Court gave in awarding the custody of the children
to the mother. Appellant contends that this finding
required the Court to find that the Defendant was
less stable than the Plaintiff. Assuming that this implied finding was made, arguendo, Respondent
submits that there is ample evidence to sustain such
a finding and without attempting to exhaust the
record, Respondent will call the Court's attention
to portions of the transcript.
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Respondent testified that the Defendant tried to
make her appear inadequate as a wife and mother
by following her, talking with other teachers and
neighbors, saying derrogatory things about her to
such people, threatening to go to the principal with
stories about her that were untrue, and by talking
about her faults with the children (T. 173). Babysitters told Plaintiff that Defendant said things about
her in her absence to the children and told the children not to tell mother about the subjects discussed (T. 176, 177). The Defendant also conducted
visits with the children in a covert manner and
would hide when he saw Plaintiff returning home,
and he asked the children to keep track of who was
calling Plaintiff (T. 177). He asked Plaintiff in the
presence of the children and a workman if she were
running a whore house (T. 179). When the Defendant was supposedly attending the university
full time, he had withdrawn and was only pretending to go to school (T. 180). When Defendant realized that the marriage was not going to work out,
he began to work on the children, telling them that
their mother did not love them and that she Wfil3
never home (T. 189).
On one occasion, a man was in Plaintiff's home
(T. 201-205). Defendant admitted that he had called
the man's wife and asked to speak to her husband
knowing that he was not home. When the wife advised the Defendant that her husband was bowling, Defendant asked if she were sure. Eventually
he told the woman that her husband was then in
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Plain tiff's home and had her come to retrieve her
husband. Defendant had implied that the relationship between Plaintiff and the man was improper.
Defendant then discussed the whole transaction
with the children as if he knew nothing about the
situation which he had caused to happen (T. 249251).
Defendant also testified that he thought he had
had a heart attack, but it was nerves. Defendant
"had this condition where I had heart pains all the
time from seeing her in this car. ...... " (T. 288).
Defendant testified he saw his wife in a car, and
that it looked like she was necking. " ..... finally
she turned around and drove by to see if she could
see me, and I just walked-I ignored them both.
I was so mad I was afraid I would start swinging
so I walked over to the parking lot. . . . .".
The Defendant also testified that he had come
home to prepare lunches and dinner and was usually home before the Plaintiff.
From the record the court, on Defendant's own
testimony, could find psycho-somatic sysmptoms of
heart disease which would indicate an anxiety
neurosis or something more serious. The super-control of his emotions when he walked away rather
than hit someone and the undue concern with meal
preparation and the time of arrival of the Plaintiff
from school, coupled with the incident when the
Defendant called a woman to get her husband out
of the home and away from his wife and children,
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might be taken as abnormal desire for role reversal
with his wife. The fact that Plaintiff also earned
more as a teacher than Defendant, could be involved as well in role reversal. The covert manner
of visitation, the threats to tell on the Plaintiff to
the principal, the remarks made to other teachers
and to neighbors about the Plaintiff, and the attempt
to deal secretly with the children and to have them
spy on their mother, indicate a craft and guile that
would easily justify a finding of demonstrated emotional instability. The court could even have found
that "in seeking to hold the custody of his boys
(i.e. children) the Defendant has exhibited great bitterness toward Plaintiff and has done serious harm
to his children as a result thereof." 2
It is submitted that the District Court was justified in finding Plaintiff more emotionally stable than
the Defendant.

Appellant sets out several numbered paragraphs under his B subheading to his Point I. Much
of the argument made by Appellant under these
sub-paragraphs has already been discussed above
as indicating his instability. It is also obvious that
the portions selected from the transcript are
disputed in evidence or were found by the District
Court to be of little weight from an evidentiary
viewpoint. The first numbered paragraph deals
with in-chambers testimony by the children. As Appellant points out, the T:rial Court once continued
2·

Wiese v. Wiese, 469 P. 2d 504, 507.
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trial after interviews with two of the children stating that both parties had attempted to influence the
children improperly. The Trial Court may not have
believed this children's testimony, or assigned little
weight to the testimony. Respondent submits it is
not likely that she became a compulsive thief only
after the action was filed, or that she remained in
control of her alleged affliction only so long as her
stability was assured by the physical presence of
the Defendant.
One more observation should be made with
respect to the testimony of children in chambers.
There is certainly a practice in the courts to shield
the children of the parties to a divorce from the
effects of the trial and from any ill-feelings parents
may have as a result of what is said in chambers. It
is usual for a Judge to instruct parents that they
are not to ask what the children have said, and in
this case the parties were not present.
As to a propensity to theft, the record does not
even indicate that Plaintiff knew what the children
said, let alone have an opportunity to refute or explain their testimony, or to discover what Defendant
might have told them.
Respondent must take offense at the phrasing
of Appellant's sub-paragraph 2. It is certain that
there is a dispute as to the evidence on the point.
There was a man in the house, and the Defendant
called his wife to come investigate rather than calling Plaintiff and giving her an opportunity to tell
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Defendant what, if anything, was going on. It is
submitted that if the Defendant were believed as to
his suspicions, that the Plaintiff were "running a
whore house", or put the children in a situation in
which the Plaintiff were improperly conducting
herself with men in their presence, certainly a District Judge would have said something about such
conduct if he did not deprive the mother of custody
for such behavior. This seems patricularly true
when Defendant's part in this situation was fully
disclosed. He had told the children nothing about
his part in the matter according to his own testimony, and said he only asked what had happened.
This sort of activity, coupled with the Court's continuation of the trial because the parties had tried
to influence the children, show the weight that Defendant's testimony should receive. 1
Sub-points 3 and 4 are of the same nature. They
deal with attempts to pick fly specks from pepper.
Both points again rehash whether or not Defendant
was stable or more stable than the Plaintiff. Both,
in part, rest on children's testimony in chambers,
and both again deal, in part, with the Father's ability as a housewife; and by way of illustrating the
petty nature of these items even more, Defendant
claims, in his brief at Page 12, that the Plaintiff's
problem is accentuated by the fact that she teaches
Home Economics]
3.

The scope of review in an equity case is property confined
to undisputed testimony, see Olivero v. Eleganti (1923) 61
Utah 475 quoted in Stanley v. Stanley, 97 utah 520, 94 P. 2d
465.
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- Sub-points C., D., and E. again attempt to show
why the children would be better off with their
father. In view of Appellant's representation that
the children are not emotionally disturbed, the
Court's finding that Plaintiff taught emotionally disturbed children rather than retarded children seems
immaterial. Likewise immaterial would be the fact
that Defendant taught emotionally disturbed children. It is clear that the Court really found more
stability on the part of Plaintiff and attributed this
to her experience as a teacher (T. 62). In addition,
the phrase first appears in the Court's own order
of October 3, 1969, (T. 27-28) as "The Court believes
that presently, the mother as such, with her training
and background has more to offer the children."
The language "because of her special training and
background in working with emotionally disturbed
children" is found in a document prepared by Defendant' s attorney (T. 50) and signed by the Court
on December 17, 1969, as a part of a document running from T. 48 to T. 55 which followed a hearing
concerned primarily with contempt, support, and
visitation problems (T. 38 and 39). If error has been
committed, it appears to have been invited or else
to have resulted from inadvertance. In either case,
the solution is to restore the original language
which the Court used rather than to permit Defendant an advantage which results from his draftman' s error.
Appellant makes much of the choice of two of
the children to live with their father. The testimony
of -the children, taken as a whole, shows such a

11

preference, but it did not show their mother unfit.
It is submitted that the District Court wisely held
is hand in making a permanent award of custody
to give time to see what the situation might produce. This emphasis also ignores the action taken
by the Legislature in 1969.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was
a.mended in 1969 to eliminate the provision which
permitted children of ten years of age to attach
themselves to the parent of their choice. There is
no doubt that this provision had been questioned
and that decisions were in conflict as to the weight
to be given such a choice. The variety of treatment
by the courts ranged from the view that unless a
parent were absolutely unfit the choice of the child
was binding to the view that the choice was entitled to some consideration with all of the other
facts in the case.
There is no doubt that the elimination of the
choice had purpose, and the legislature has indicated that this wish or preference is something the
Court will consider in a case along with all the evidence to determine what will be best for the children. 4 This the Court did.
The Court's decision was supported by evidence, and if the situation changes, the same section permits the Court to modify its custody order
at any time hereafter.
4.

"The desire of the child is merely one of the factors to be
considered in making a determination of the custody whic:h
will be for his best interest." Weiss v. Weiss, 469 P. 2d 504,
506.
.
,
:
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In summary of the custody problem then, Respondent submits that all of the evidence taken together supports the decision of the Trial Court that
the children should be awarded to their mother.
POINT II
THE ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT RESPECTING THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, THE
PAYMENT OF SUPPORT, THE PAYMENT OF THE
DEBTS OF THE PARTIES, AND THE DIVISION OF
THEIR PROPERTY ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND ITS ORDERS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Respondent submits that essentially there are
three main parts to a divorce case. The first thing to
do is to decide whether there are grounds for divorce and who gets it if both parties petition for
relief. The second part is the question of the custody
of the children. The third part is economic; that is,
how shall the property be divided, how shall the
children be supported, who shall pay costs and
fees, and who shall pay remaining debt.
The third category cannot be treated as if each
item involved in family economics were contained
in a vacuum. The use of money for one purpose prevents its use for another. The Court is faced with the
task of trying to determine how a family can survive
financially after a divorce when it is apparent from
a lack of savings and a large indebtedness that the
people were anything but rich when they were together.
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It is certainly true that only the rich and the
poor are not faced with basic financial problems
different than existed before the separation.
The evidence in the case indicates that the Defendant paid his attorney a substantial fee. The
Court ordered the same amount paid to Plaintiff's attorney by the Defendant. It also ordered the Defendant to pay some of the bills and to pay $50.00
support monthly for each child.
The Plaintiff was also ordered to pay some of
the debts of the parties. She must have expected
to assist in the support of the children from the
amount awarded to her as support and from the deferral of support for a period of time.
The property division also must be considered,
in that each party was awarded one half of the home
and furniture to be used by the person having the
custody of the children. The home of the parties
was purchased with the aid of a loan from Defendant' s father. This loan is to be repaid. The home
is subject to a mortgage for its purchase and two
other loans made for improvements.
At the time of trial and at the time of the subsequent orders made by the Trial Court, the parties
were heavily in debt. The Trial Court, very proper1y, made orders which would allow the parties to
pay their creditors and continue to exist at the same
time. There can be no fomula for the payment of
each debt incurred when the proceeds went to family uses. The Defendant-Appellant pay his attorney,
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and the Court also ordered him to pay the Plaintiff's attorney an equal fee. The debt for representation was obviously earned by both attorneys. Plaintiff's attoreny appeared as often as did Defendant's
attorney, and upon review, it is apparent that the
case was heavily contested at all points as this
Court may note from the review of the record. The
cost of representation in Court cannot be avoided
in a trial. It seems that payment of a fee is a necessity and is so normally an incident of a divorce as
to be considered in the total division of the property, and the payment of the debt. 5 It is further submitted that when Defendant counter-claimed, Plaintiff was compelled to defend.
Nothing in the record is sufficient to warrant a
finding that the Plaintiff's conduct was so gross as
to deprive her of a right to representation.6 Nothing
in the record indicates that Plaintiff was so well off
financially that she could easily pay all debts or that
the Defendant was unable to pay the debts ordered
paid by the Court.
It is rather obvious that the Trial Court knew
that four people had to live on the Plaintiff's earnings and the contribution of support paid by the
Defendant while the Defendant had only a need
to support himself. The Court also considered the
5.

6.

Awards of suit money do not require a party
be
and depend on the circumstances of the parties. Weiss v.
Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P. 2d 1005; Grittiths v. Grittths,
3 Utah 2d 82, 278 P. 2d 983.

McBroom v. McBroow, supra.
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length of time the debts would exist if payments
were made as ordered.
While this Court might, on the same evidence,
make a different award of property or a different
order for payment of debts and fees and order a
different amount paid for support, it cannot be said
that the Trial Judge abused his discretion. The District Court had to do its best to make an order the
parties could live with, and it did. Its order also permits the situation of each party, particularly that of
the Defendant, to improve as the debts are satisfied.
Within a short foreseeable time, the debts can be
paid, and each party can then proceed to such a
"new" life as capabilities and prudence permit.
The standards to be considered in the "economic portion" of a divorce case are (a) all of the
facts and circumstances, (b) the duration of the marriage, (c) the age of the parties, (d) their social position and their standard of living, (e) health, mconsiderations re children, (g) money and property
possessed and how acquired, (h) capabilities and
training, and (i) present and potential incomes. 7
Respondent submits that the Trial Court prop-.
erly considered all of the factors involved in the
case and stayed within the limits of sound discretion in making necessary financial provisions for
the parties.
1·

Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296_P.

97'1..
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CONCLUSIONS
The lower court on disputed evidence made its
findings, and the findings are support by competent evidence. There is nothing in the record or in
the orders made by the Court to allow a conclusion
here that the decree was unjust, inequitable, or contrary to the evidence. The decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent
732 Judge Building

